Rogue DHCP Server
A rogue DHCP server is an unauthorized DHCP server that responds to client requests on a network, potentially disrupting legitimate network operations or creating security vulnerabilities. These can be accidentally deployed (misconfigured devices) or maliciously installed to intercept network traffic.
How Rogue DHCP Servers Cause Problems
- IP Address Conflicts: Multiple DHCP servers assigning overlapping IP ranges creates duplicate address assignments
- Incorrect Network Configuration: Clients may receive wrong default gateway, DNS servers, or subnet masks
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: Malicious rogue servers can redirect traffic through attacker-controlled gateways
- Network Segmentation Bypass: Clients might receive addresses from wrong VLANs or subnets
- Service Disruption: Legitimate clients unable to obtain proper network configuration
Detection Methods
- DHCP Snooping Logs: Cisco switches log untrusted DHCP offers when snooping is enabled
- Network Monitoring: Tools like Wireshark can capture multiple DHCP OFFER messages from different servers
- IP Helper Statistics: Routers track DHCP relay statistics showing multiple server responses
- Client Behavior: Users reporting intermittent connectivity or wrong network settings
DHCP Snooping (Primary Defense)
DHCP Snooping is the most effective protection against rogue DHCP servers - it creates trusted and untrusted interfaces on Layer 2 switches.
Configuration Concept
- Trusted Ports: Allow DHCP server messages (OFFER, ACK, NAK) - typically uplinks to legitimate DHCP servers
- Untrusted Ports: Block DHCP server messages, only allow client messages (DISCOVER, REQUEST) - typically access ports
- Binding Database: Tracks legitimate IP-to-MAC-to-Port mappings for additional security features
Key Commands (Cisco)
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Additional Snooping Features
- Rate Limiting: Prevents DHCP starvation attacks by limiting requests per second on untrusted ports
- Option 82: Adds switch information to DHCP requests for tracking and security
- Binding Table: Creates foundation for Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) and IP Source Guard
Alternative Protection Methods
| Method | Effectiveness | Use Case | Limitations |
|---|---|---|---|
| DHCP Snooping | High | Layer 2 switched networks | Requires switch support |
| Port Security | Medium | Prevents unauthorized devices | Doesn’t prevent software-based rogues |
| 802.1X Authentication | High | Enterprise environments | Complex deployment |
| VLAN Segmentation | Medium | Isolate DHCP servers | Doesn’t prevent same-VLAN rogues |
| Manual IP Assignment | High | Small, controlled networks | Not scalable |
Vocabulary
- DHCP Snooping: Layer 2 security feature that filters DHCP messages based on port trust state
- Binding Database: Table mapping IP addresses to MAC addresses and switch ports
- Trusted Interface: Port allowed to send DHCP server responses (OFFER, ACK, NAK)
- Untrusted Interface: Port that can only send DHCP client messages (DISCOVER, REQUEST)
- DHCP Starvation: Attack exhausting DHCP pool by requesting all available addresses
Notes
- Always enable DHCP snooping on access switches in enterprise environments - it’s your primary defense
- Trust uplink ports and ports connected to legitimate DHCP servers/relays only
- Enable binding database to support DAI and IP Source Guard for comprehensive Layer 2 security
- Consider DHCP reservations for critical devices (servers, printers, network equipment) to prevent conflicts
- Monitor DHCP pool utilization - rogue servers or attacks can quickly exhaust available addresses
- In military/government networks, unauthorized DHCP servers are considered hostile reconnaissance - immediate containment protocols apply
- Remember: DHCP operates at Layer 2/3 boundary - protection requires both switch-level controls and network monitoring
- Rate limiting on untrusted ports prevents both accidental misconfigurations and intentional attacks